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ABSTRACT
THE CONCEPT OF MONETARY UNION 
AND
THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM 
by
NEJAT MAKARNACI 
MBA Thesis
Bilkent University— Ankara 
February, 1989
Supervisor: Dr. Gökhan Çapoglu
This research analyzes the concept of the monetary 
union and the European Monetary System (ENS). It consists of 
three parts.
The first part starts by covering the concept of monetary 
union and the theoretical conditions that may contribute to the 
success of a monetary union, and ends by defining the EMS 
studying the motives for its development.
The second part studies the functioning of the ENS from 
a technical point of view. It does this by dealing with the 
exchange rate and intervention mechanism, the European 
Currency Unit (ECU), and the existing credit mechanisms.
The third part of this research tries to evaluate the 
perfomance of the EMS. Firstly, it studies the stability of 
exchange rates as a first step in achieving a monetary union. 
Next, it reviews the convergency of economic variables that 
have either direct or indirect effect on the exchange rate 
variability. Finally, this research lookes at the higher 
growth and employment objectives of a monetary union through 
increased intra—union trade.
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ÖZET
Bu tez ana olarak para birliği kavramını ve Avrupa para 
sistemini inceleyecektir.. Tez üç kısımdan oluşmaktadır.
ilk kisim Para birliği kavramı ve para birliğinin başarılı 
olmasına katkıda bulunabilecek koşulların incelenmesi ile
başlayacak, ve Avrupa Para Sisteminin tanımlanması ve onun 
gelişmesi için gerekli motivlerin incelenmesi ile son bulacaktır.
ikinci kısımda Avrupa Para Sisteminin çalışması daha çok teknik 
bir bakış açIsl ile incelenecektir. Bu inceleme döviz kuru ve 
müdahale mekanizması, merkezi kurlar ve müdahale mekanizmasındaki 
kurallar, Avrupa Para Birimi ve şu anda var olan kredi 
mekanizması üzerinde çalışılarak tamamlanacaktır.
Bu araştırmanın üçüncü kisminda, Avrupa Para Sisteminin 
performansı değerlendirilmeye çalışılacaktır. öncelikle para
birliğinin kurulmasında ilk adim olan döviz kurlarının 
kararlılığı ana temas konusu olarak araştırılacaktır.
Ekonomilerin yakınsaması, döviz kuru birliğinin önemi
düşünülerek, döviz kuru değişimi üzerinde direk ve endirek etkisi 
olan ekonomik değişkenlerin araştırılması ile ele alınacaktır. 
Işlsr'i3cek son konu para birliğinin hem birlik içinde ticaret 
hemde yerli ve diş talebi artırarak sağlaması beklenen yüksek 
kalkınma hizl ve iş olanakları olacaktır.
INTRODUCTION
Monetary unions are expected to lead a better economic 
performance in the union by alleviating the speculative 
movements, increasing the intra-community trade, allocating the 
capital production factors optimally, making possible the use of 
mutual assistance between the participants. It is also argued 
that the world trade and thus, economic activity would improve by 
forming monetary unions among the countries that have properties 
to participate in the union.
Since participation in a monetary union may constitute a 
cornerstone in a country's economy, it is important that prons 
and cons of being a member in a monetary union may well be 
judged, and whether or not the country has some of the factors 
among the ones that are expected to contribute success to the 
country in case of participation. The degree of convercency of 
the economies and to which degree this convergency can be 
achieved is one of the important issues since it may be this 
convergency that may prevent the exchange rate volatility in case 
of liberalization of capital mobility in the way of going to a 
full economic integration. The another issue which will be 
adressed in this research is whether or not establishing a common 
central bank . It will be studied in connection with the aim of 
using a single currency within the borders of monetary union, and 
the common monetary policy that may prevent exchange rate 
variability even when, capital movements are liberalized.
PART 1. THE THEORETICAL REASONS FOR FORMING A MONETARY 
UNION AND THE EMS AND THE MOTIVES FOR 
DEVELOPING THE EMS
1.1 Monetary union and Theoretical Conditions for 
its Success
Monetary union is defined as the union in which 
participating countries accept to use a common currency in
the union or creating a basket type currency. This also
requires a common central bank that has the authority to
issue the currency. However attaining a monetary union
may be realized in two steps. The first step is to keep the
exchange rate fluctuations within a close margin and to
succeed with the intraconvertibility of the currencies in the
union. The final step is achieved when the participating
countries use a single currency as a means of payments. The
idea of forming of a monetary union was first developed by
Mündel (1961) in his article on optimum currency areas.
According to his article a shift in demand from goods of
region A to the goods of region B would cause unemployment
and income fall in region A. Region A will suffer an
economic recession.This shift would result in trade surplus
and inflationary pressures in region B. A depreciation of the
currency of A in terms of currency B, could switch
back demand toward A, offsetting internal disturbances. A
high degree of factor mobility in terms of migration
will increase the supply of factors of production and
output in B. This will alleviete the inflationary pressures
^ S ee , Mundell <1P<S1>.
in B, while reducing unemployment in A. Factor mobility, 
then, acts as a substitute for exchange rate changes in 
achieving internal and external equilibrium and improving 
welfare in both regions. Hence, factor mobility is an 
important condition for a successful! monetary union.(12)
A second condition for a monetary union is the
2openness of the economy which was argued by McKinnon 
McKinnon discusses that small and open economies will not be 
able to use flexible exchange rates because domestic prices 
would react quickly to exchange rate changes in such 
economies. It would eliminate the impact of exchange rate 
changes that would switch the consumption to domestic goods, 
hence improving the trade balance of the economy. Hence, a 
country with small and open economy may be advised to 
participate in the monetary union and peg its currency.
The fact that a country has diversified products also 
affects the country to participate in a monetary union 
positively. Because supposing a country with specialized 
products in its exports, a sudden decline in the demand for 
that product would have severe effects on the economy of 
this country resulting balance of payment balance worsening 
and unemployment. This decline would have had less severe 
effects on the economy of the country with more diversified 
products to export. So the former country with concentrated 
products are more bound to make the products prices
attractive again by depreciating its currency (Kenen)^. The
2
S ee  McKtnnon <1P<53>
3
S e e  Kenen <1P09>
liberalization of capital movements is also important in the 
monetary union considering the case that a slight increase 
of the real interest rates would attract foreign capital 
inflow hence improve the balance of payment deficit. This
4mechanism was proposed by Ingram (7). However,the criticism 
of this mechanism is that the country is not actually 
eliminating its balance of payments problem but borrowing at 
the expense of future payments.
The convergence of the inflation rates is an important 
condition for the survival of a monetary union. The 
importance of the convergence of the inflation rates stems 
from the need to stabilize the exchange rates. Its 
effect may be explained as follows . The increasing prices 
would cause a deterioration in the trade balance of the 
high inflation country. The country needs to devalue its 
currency to regain the competiveness.
1.2 The European Monetary System and Motives for its 
Development
Economic integration requires the integration of both 
good markets and the money markets to achieve the free 
movements of factors of production. Only then, there will be 
an optimal allocation of the resources.
European Monetary System in which eight country 
participate and the United Kingdom and Breece is 
represented in one of its aspects, the ECU, is a system that 
aims at realizing a monetary union within the framework of 
the European Economic Community. The EMS aims at forming
S ee  Ingram <1P<S2 and J.P73>
4
monetary union by first, ensuring fluctuations among the 
member currencies to narrow margins, and at the same time, 
ensuring the regional interconvertibi1ty among the 
currencies, and finally, making use of a common currency 
unit among the member countries.
In addition to the reason to achieve an economic 
integration in the EEC, the studies towards a monetary 
corporation were initiated by both internal and external 
considerations. The EMS was inspired by the dissatisfactions 
with the floating exchange rate system, and internal factors. 
Firstly, internal motives to form a monetary union are:
i- The possibility of mutual assistance in case of serious 
balance of payment difficulties.
ii- To encourage the intra—trade among the member countries 
by lowering the speculative movements on the currencies.
iii- To decrease the exchange rate risk attached holding 
European currencies vis a vis dollar, thus increasing their 
attractiveness as reserve assets for the European Central 
Bank.(9)
iv- To Ensure small fluctuations of the currencies that would 
lead to a path towards converging and stabilizing the main
macroeconomic variables, such as growth rates of the 
economies, inflation rate, unemployment rate, real interest 
rate within the certain levels.
V -  To realize the joint fluctuation of Community 
currencies vis a vis the dollar that would end up with 
the common monetary policy toward foreign countries.
However,efforts to form a monetary union was mostly 
affected by external factors.
One of these factors is the dissatisfaction with the 
floating exchange rate system. In the clean floating 
exchange rate system, exchange rate changes adjust to 
eliminate balance of payments deficit or surpluses of the 
related country. However, in the fixed exchange rate system a 
country suffering from balance of payment deficit has to 
apply restrictive monetary and/or fiscal policies, control­
ling imports and capital outflows. The adjustment mechanism 
of the floating exchange rate systems offers independence in 
macroeconomic goals such as aggregate spending.
The emprical evidence shows that the balance of payments 
imbalances are not eliminated under the flexible exchange ra­
te system and remained large since 1973 (9). Moreover depre­
ciation will have a positive effect on the trade balance if 
the price advantage due to the depreciation is not offset by 
the inflation rate. The phenomenon overshooting' is also 
likely to occur in the following way. A country whose cur­
rency has appreciated, say due to the trade surplus, will 
attract capital flow into the country because of the better 
earning possibility and expectation of further appreciation, 
this would force the currency to appreciate more. The 
reverse would also work. Such capital mobility with the 
tendency to adjust more rapidly than goods markets also 
reduces the degree of insulation which exchange rate 
flexibilty was supposed to provide (9).
The J-curve effect that stems from the slow response of 
the quantity of exports to appreciation or depreciation 
makes it difficult for the adjustment mechanism work 
effectively.
2. THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EMS
The one of the objectives of the EMS is the exchange 
rate stability. The exchange rate and the intervention 
mechanism determines when the related countries would 
take necessary measurements. Another aspect is the Europestn 
Currency Unit that is a step to complete the full monetary 
union. The final topics will be the Eurapestn Monetary 
Fund and the existing credit mechanisms.
2.1 The Exchange Rate and the Intervention Mechanism
The exchange rate and the intervention mechanism
contains two elements:
i- The first one is based on maintaining bilateral central 
rates between the engaging countries. The bilateral central 
rates are expressed as a certain quantity of currency of 
one country with respect to that of the other country. 
Around this central rates, bilateral fluctuations are kept 
within limits (+/~ 2.25X , except for Italy, +/- 6X ) by 
intervening in the foreign exchange market.
ii- The second one is based on the divergence indicator. This 
element entails to intervene when the currency deviates 
certain amount in terms of the ECU. It will be explaned in 
the section 2.1.2.
2.1.1 Central Rates and the Rules for Intervention
Before going into the analysis of the intervention 
mechanism it may be useful to define the EC“¿/-related central 
rates. The E^ Ct/-related central rates are expressed as a 
certain quantity currency per ECLH3) . But more properly 
one over the ECt/—related central rates are used to find the 
bilateral central rates. One example is the following:
X: The ECii-related central rate for Holland Florin(HFL)
X = 2.59595 (3) ==>
(1/X) = 0.39589
Y: The ECU—related central rate for Deutch Mark(DM)
Y= 2.24184 (3) ==>
(1/Y) = 0.44063
If the value of DM based bilateral central rate, i.e what the
value of one HFL in terms of DM, is wanted to be found in
terms of HFL, then 
(1/X) 0.395890
------  = --------  = 0.887522 (DM/HFL)
(1/Y) 0.446063
There are two types of intervention mechanism:
i— Compulsory Intervention : Intervention is compulsory when­
ever currency reaches its intervention limit relative to 
another currency. The authorized institutions of the two 
currencies are then required to intervene on their relevant 
markets in order to keep these currencies within their 
fluctuation limits . To express this differently, the bank of 
the strong currency purchases the weak currency, while the 
bank of the weak currency sells the strong currency.
ii- Intra Marginal Intervention : There exists two types of
8
intramarginal intervention. The first type is used to cut the 
tendency that a currency will reach its limit. This
intervention is usually made in U.S dollars. In most cases,
this may impose problems. The second type of the intervention
is a novelty one. It is made by the intramarginal
intervention that is performed by the rules governing the 
operation of the divergence indicator. It is worth to study 
in more detail.
2.1.2 The Divergence Indicator
The divergence indicator makes it possible to 
determine the position and the movement of a currency in 
the EMS with respect to community average represented by the 
ECU.
To calculate divergence indicator and observe the 
position of one currency relative to the other, maximum 
divergence spread (MDS) for each currency calculated. This 
spread gives the maximum percentage appreciation or 
depreciation that the market rate of the ECU in terms of 
a given currency may show against its central rate (9). 
This can be obtained when any currency in the ENS. including 
Sterling and Drahmi deviates 2.25% in the same direction from 
all the other currencies in the EMS. Table.1 in appendix 
highlights the concept of maximum divergence spread for DM.
A Careful 1 observation of the Table.1 reveals that 
the 2.25 7. depreciation of all currencies of the EMS 
against D. Mark brings 1.478% of depreciation of tl; ECU
against D. Mark. The MDS is computed for each curfeu y in a 
similar way, then the divergence thre lold for each c:ar rem:y
is determined as t.ha 75 '/. of the MDF ! i ir-^ ahold. For instance 
i!; is 1: 1085 X for DM in (¡1/02/1-^ 33,
-shortly, the divet yence indicator(PI) measures the 
degree of movement of a specific currency against its 
ilia; i siimif divergence spread. Two distincts step may be useful 
to introduce the concept of DI,
i— Firstly, the calculation of the positive or
negative divergence shown by the market rate of the ECU 
of one currency against its ECt/-related central rate.
ii— Comparison of the result obtained with the MDS. This 
analysis provides to which degree of the MDS in %, a currency 
has reached. The higher the percantage, the more urgent the 
intervention will be necessary. When DI reaches 75X, it 
means the currency reached its threshold level.
2.2 The ECU and its Functions
The ECU is defined as a basket type currency which is made 
up of a certain combinations of the currencies of ten 
EEC countries.
The composition of the ECU is defined as the fixed 
amounts of the currencies in ECU during a specific time 
period (See the 2nd column of table.1 in appendix for the 
composition in 01-02—1988). This period covers a time 
duration of 5 years. However, when the weight of one 
currency changes by 25X or more the composition of ECU is 
to be reexamined. The weight of a currency in the basket 
is found by diving the amount of the currency by the 
ECi/-related central rate of that currency. For example the 
weight of DM in 01/02/1988
10
0.71900
------  = 0.34798 or in % = 34.798 (See figure.1
2.06618 in appendix)
Suppose the value of DM becomes 2.7549 after a certain period 
then the weight of DM is found to be 0.2609. If the change 
in weight is computed
0.34798-0.2609
O.34798
#100 = 25.02 7.
then the composition is to be changed,
The ECi/-re la ted rate of any currency is determined in 
two steps:
i- A currency is taken as a numeraire, and the exchange 
rates of the other currencies in terms of this currency 
is set /?ji, then
lO
ECUi = j; j4j#/?ji
j=i
j4js are the amounts in the first column of table 1. ECUi is 
the value of one currency in terms of curreny 1.
ii— Then, the value of one ECU in any currency is found by
multiplying ECU± by the value of that currency in terms of 
, 5currency 1
The ECU is used for four purposes in the EMSi
i- as a denominator for the determination of central rates 
in the exchange rate mechanism. (See 2.1.1)
ii- as the reference unit for the construction and the
operation of the divergence indicator. (See 2.1.2)
5
S ee  Van, Y p e rse le  <1P85)
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iii- as the denominator for operations performed both in 
the intervention and the credit mechanism^ .
iv- as a means of settlement between the monetary authorities 
of the EEC.
To serve as a means of settlement, an initial supply of ECU 
is provided by the FECOM^ against the deposit of 20V. of 
gold and 20X of dollar reserves held by central banks (9).
This operation has been taken place through three—months 
revolving swaps (9). At the beginning of each three 
months countries participating the EMS puts their 20% of 
gold reserves and 20% of their dollar reserves.
2.3 The Existing Credit Mechanisms
There are three types of credit mechanisms in the EMS. 
These credit mechanisms are mainly used for assisting a 
country facing balance of payment deficit. They are : 
i- Very short term financing: It consists of the reciprocal 
cash facility among the ERt^ participating central banks. 
Access to this facility is automatic and unlimited for 
purposes of intervention at the outside of the margins.(4)
ii- Short term monetary support: It provides short term
finance for temporary Balance of Payment deficits or sudden 
declines in foreign exchange rate reserves.(4)
iii- Medium term financial assistance: It provides financial 
assistance for balance of payment support with resources 
subject to conditionality .
S ee  Van, Y pe ree le  <1P05>.
FECOM is  the french equ iva len t of European Monetary
Cooperation  Fund. It is  mostly used instead of EMCF. 
0
ERM is  used fo r Exchange Rate Mechanism.
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PART 3 - PERFORMANCE OF THE EMS
3.1 The Greater Exchange Rate Stability
3.1.1 Conceptual Considerations
The exchange rate variability imposes costs on economic 
agents (5). It has been suggested that short term swings 
of exchange rates around equilibrium level are of minor 
importance, because the risk involved can be hedged, whereas 
medium and long term movements away from equilibrium level 
may impose costly shifts in capital and labor factors.Another 
argument is that unexpected exchange rate changes impose the
9most severe costs .(5)
The EMS implies the exchange rate stability among
the countries through two channelIs;
i- In the short term by intervention mechanism described in
part two. The important problem in the short term that
exchange rate mechanism has to deal with is the overshooting 
phenomenon. Overshooting phenomenon may force exchange rates 
to be realigned. Overshooting phenomenon occurs when an 
economy suffers from a disturbance such as sudden increase
in the money supply and the value of the currency
depreciates more than it has to do.
ii- In the long term, the countries will have to take
internal measures to attain the exchange rate stability. If 
a country is having a balance of payment deficit, then it can 
eliminate this deficit by using domestic restrictive
policies. It is no longer free to depreciate its currency to
S ee  IMF O ccasional Paper No. 4S.
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increase the exports. One of such policies is restricting 
the money supply, hence increasing the interest rates, 
lowering the income level,causing unemployment. The other 
domestic policy option may be shrinking budget expenditures 
considering the effect of it on the current balance. It 
is clear that these measures have very negative effects on 
the economy . However, cooperating the monetary union 
assumes that in such cases countries are better to 
collaborate in such a way that the country having balance 
of payment surplus, with trade surplus, would raise the 
inflation rate thus, competitiveness of the country with 
balance of payment deficit would rise, hence this country 
would not resort internal measures in such a severe degree.
There is also an argument that a system of fixed , but
adjustable, exchange rates would not hold together for a
long time and it would degenerate into a system of frequent
small exchange rate adjustments very smilar to crawling peg 
10system This view has not yet been proved.
Exchange rate realignments may become inevitable although 
they are postponed by the credit mechanism of the EMS, and 
by the intermediate and short term monetary measures of
the countries of the weak currencies provided that these 
countries do not take appropriate and sufficient policy 
measures (4).
Liberalization of the capital movements also poses a 
problem about exchange rate stability. It is argued that 
liberalization of capital movements would result in the 
optimum allocation of the sources, hence contribute to
S ee  IMF O ccasional Paper No. 48
14
an increase in employment growth. However, there are still 
capital controls within the EMS. The reason for this may 
stem from the fear that countries might face a large 
outflow of capital. In addition to this, countries would 
have to face a special problem in the in the case of large 
capital movements: the burden of adjustment to capital
movements would lie only on interest rates whereas in a 
floating exchange rate system, exchange rate movements help to 
slow down the effects. In other words currency depreciation 
would help to eliminate the balance of payment deficit
through the improvement in the trade account (provided 
that Marshall Learner condition is satisfied). It is also 
offset via improving capital account by pushing up the 
interest rates. Artis^^ briefly discusses this subject,
providing a support for the argument that capital controls 
may prove useful in the short run to reconcile the conflicts 
that nominal exchange rate stability may pose for real 
exchange rate developments (1). A country facing a large 
capital outflow may experience a sharp increase in its 
domestic interest rates under a fixed exchange rate system. 
The only possibility for a country trying to avoid large 
fluctuations in its interest rates in the absence of 
capital controls would be to devalue or revalue its
currency. This is against the purpose of the fixed exchange 
rate system. Consequently, the fear is whether the
countries would frequently realign the value of their 
currencies so as to avoid large interest rate
differentials after removing the capital controls. Because
11
S ee  A rtis  <1P87>
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of the early age of the EMS, it is not possible to conclude
that the achievement in the exchange rate stability is
affected by the capital controls. This fact is illustrated
12in Rogoff's paper . In his paper, Rogoff reaches only a
conditional conclusion by noting that if capital controls
have been substantialy responsible for the success of the
ENS in stabilizing the exchange rates, then the EMS
experience has only limited relevance as a model for
countries with open capital markets.(ll)
There are two views on the liberalization of the capital
movements within the EEC. One view is that, given existing
divergences in economic performance, in particular with
regard to inflation and interest rates , any significant
progress toward free mobility of capital would facilitate
large scale destabilizing capital movements frusturating
efforts to maintain exchange rate stability ^^(15). Another
view is that the liberalization of capital movements would
intensify pressure on the EliS countries to adopt compatible
economic policies leading to convergent economic develop- 
14ments - Dr. Wilhelm No1ling dicusses that if a common 
monetary policy and highly cordinated fiscal policies are 
used, and real interest differentials are eliminated these 
destabilizing effects are diminished. Pursuing a common 
monetary policy brings the issue of establishing a common 
central bank since it will facilitate using a common monetary
12
13
Se© Rogoff <lpe5>.
S ee  V ilhelm  N o llin g  (1S>8B>.
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S e e  IMF O ccasional Paper No. tfl.
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policy. However, there are differing opinions on creating a 
common monetary policy in the EC and establishing a European 
central bank. One view is in favour of implementing these 
as fast as possible so as to promote economic convergence 
of the participating countries. Opposing to this is the view 
that European national economies are still to diverse that a 
common currency and central bank may become too risky.(15)
3.1.2 Actual Evidences
There is a study conducted by Manuel Guitan, Massimo Russo, 
and Giuseppe^^ to measure whether or not the exchange rate 
variability has fallen. The strongest conclusion to be 
obtained from the study is that variability of bilateral 
exchange rates among ERM currencies has fallen since 1979, 
regardless of the measure chosen and irrespective of whether 
nominal or real exchange rates were used (See app.table 2) 
This means not only has the EMS succeded in generating 
greater stability of nominal exchange rates , but also price 
developments have converged . This can be inferred 
considering the relationship between the nominal and the 
real exchange rates via price levels of the countries. The 
results of this study indicates that :
i- ) The average variability of bilateral nominal exchange 
rates has fallen from 28.4X in pre-EMS period to 15.4X in 
post EMS period whereas it changed from 34.5X to 36.8X in 
the non EMS control group countries in the same period.
ii- ) The average variability of the bilateral real exchange 
15
S ee  IMF O ccasional Paper No. <S1
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rates in the same periods as above has fallen from 25.8 '/. 
to 16.17i whereas the one of non-EMS rised from 31.7% to 
36.1%.
3.2 Economic Convergence
3.2.1 Conceptual Considerations
Economic convergence for the EC countries may be defined as 
the narrowing differences in the development of economic 
variables (5). Economic convergence can also be attributed 
as a factor that can prevent the fear that liberalization of 
the capital movements would cause exchange rate volatility, 
hence more frequent realignments. However differences in 
economic development may be essential on the way to the final 
goal, fully economically integrated Europe. Real growth 
differentials may cause current account differentials that 
could require changes in the real exchange rates. It 
appears that requirements to achieve the objective of stable 
exchange rates may not always be consistent with reaching 
the final goal of full European Economic Integration in the 
short run. In practice, priority has been given to the 
achievement of the exchange rate stability objective. Thus, 
economic convergence would firstly imply narrowing differen­
ces among the variables that have a direct impact on 
the exchange rate stability. Convergence of certain economic 
variables, such as inflation rates and growth of money 
supply may sometimes appear more important than that of 
others such as fiscal balances for achieving stability in 
exchange rates (5). Moreover, the effects of exchange rate
18
divergences in some variables, for example, inflation rates, 
current account and fiscal balances, can, at least in the 
short run, be neutralized by divergences in others, for 
e>;ample, interest rates, capital account balances. So a 
situation in which divergences in those variables can offset 
each other so that exchange rate stability would not be 
affected may be possible. From this view point, convergence 
of not only monetary variables but also, up to certain degree, 
of fiscal and current account balances appears to provide the 
best basis for stable exchange rates, and resulting steps 
toward economic integration.
3.2.2 Price Developments
A Reduction and convergence in inflation rates is a 
factor that contributes success to the EMS. The convergency 
of the inflation rates is related with real exchange 
rates in a fixed, but adjustable, exchange rate system. 
If there are substantial inflation differences among the 
countries of the monetary union and if the nominal exchange 
rates are kept stable then the terms of trade of the 
inflationary country would be affected. That is, prices 
of the inflationary country would become expensive. This 
would result in the worsening of the trade balance of the 
inflationary country. Then, the inflationary country would 
have to resort restrictive domestic measures to eliminate 
the deficit in addition to the credit mechanism of the 
community. The restrictive measures would cause the un­
employment rates to increase. If there exists a substantial 
inflation differences among the countries the convergency 
of the inflation may be assured by cooperating in such a
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way that a country with less balance of payment deficit 
would let inflation rise certain amount.
Indeed, it was determined that there were correlations 
between the real exchange rates, nominal exchange rates, 
and changes in the price level (See table 3 in Appendix). 
Effect of inflation on real and nominal exchange rates 
implies that inflation differentials also affect the 
purchasing power parity condition. It is clear that 
deviations from purchasing power parity condition would
lead to speculative profit opportunities and losses. 
However one argument asserted is that capital movements 
enable exchange rate fixity with certain inflation differen­
tials. The other argument claimed that will offset the 
negative effects of inflation is the high rate of 
productivity in export industries and import competing 
sectors as the productivity would help to reduce the cost, 
hence prices.(2)
In converging the inflation rates the EMS countries are 
fairly successful! (See figure 4 and 5 in Appendix). It is 
also the case for the control group countries, USA, UK and 
Japan.
3.2.3 Real Interest Rates Developments
Convergence of the real interes rates is another factor 
implied by the system. If there are substantial differences 
among the real interest rates then, there will be capital 
inflows whose amount is determined with its mobility into 
the countries that have positive differences. If capital 
flows create balance of payments deficits in some countries 
while balance of payment surpluses in others then, this
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unbalanced situation would require some kind of interven­
tions mentioned in the previous parts. If this can not be 
avoided that it will last then, exchange rate realignments 
might become inevitable.
There is one point related with the degree of variation 
among the real interest rates.The lower the variation, the 
higher the degree of capital mobility.
Variation of real interest rates of the EMS countries 
stayed within the fluctuation limits of 1.15 and 1.65 while 
it was between 1.79 and 0.67 for the control countries with 
high degree of capital mobility. Looking at from this point, 
it may be seen that monetary union has not brought the 
higher degree of capital mobilty than the control group's 
until now..(See Table.6)
3.2.4 Monetary developments
Money supply is a factor which influences the price 
developments together with the money demand. The importance 
of money supply stems from its indirect effect on exchange 
rate changes via price differentials. In ERM countries, 
both narrow and wide monetary expansion slowed in the 1980s.
( See table 4 and 5, and figure 2 and 3 in appendix)
3.2.5 Fiscal Account
As noted earlier, Fiscal account has effects on the current 
account balance. It can be an offsetting mean to the 
divergences in the monetary account in order to achieve 
exchange rate stability. Fiscal deficit in the ERM
countries as a whole widened between the periods before and 
after the EMS, although this was also the case for the non-ERM 
countries. As a result, no trend of convergence from the
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fiscal view point has been observed xn the ERM
countries^^. (See Figure.6)
3.3 Higher Growth and Employment
The greater exchange rate stability would contribute 
economic activity through inducing both the domestic and 
foreign demand. Under an unstable exchange rate regime, the 
appreciation of the currency would make the exports of goods 
of that country more expensive and lower exports and.This 
would cause the economy to contract . As a matter of fact,it 
was the case in Germany in years 1977 and 1978 (9).
At the same time, too much depreciation of a currency 
would imply that the foreign goods are becoming expensive, 
hence the residents of the country have to decrease their 
consumption on foreign goods. Then, they will switch to 
consume domestic products. In this case, goverments are 
likely to fear to grow at a faster rate because of the 
likelihood of further depreciation.
Exchange rate stability would also help industrialists 
and businessmen to invest in different places where they see 
it has better opportunities. European executives have often 
complanied how difficult it is to give their enterprises a 
fully European dimension in view of exchange rate risks 
and uncertainty about inflation rates(9). The more invest­
ments that are undertaken the more growth will be possible 
yielding higher employment.However, the average growth rates 
of the EMS-8 stayed somewhat stable between 1.6% and 2.3% 
except for 0.8% in 1983 (4) (See Table 6 in app.). The
16 For more information, see  IMF O ccasioa l paper no. 48
2 2
unemployment levels of the countries differed lot and 
it has not been seen any significant improvement in lowering 
of unemployment level in the EMS countries.(See table.7 
in appendiK)
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CONCLUSIONS
The positive attributes in joining a monetary union are 
the high factor mobility, convergency of inflation rates 
and real interest rates, and the liberalization of capital 
movements. The monetary union is expected to increase the 
economic growth, and employment by ensuring business 
confidence and increasing both domestic and foreign demand.
Since the inception of the EWS, the inflation rates 
of the participating countries and the variability among 
both real and nominal exchange rates have declined. The 
variation in the real interest rates fluctuated in close 
margins. However, fiscal deficit as a whole widened.GNP 
measures for the average of the EWS countries have not shown 
significant increase, nor does it shown a decrease. Unemploy­
ment rates have displayed different views in different 
countries of the EMS. But, Except two countries, it did not 
increased it stayed somewhat stable.
Although it is argued that liberalization of capital 
movements would result in the optimum allocation of the 
sources, thus contribute to the activity of the economies of 
the community, there is the fear that this liberalization 
would cause exchange rate realignments to be more frequently 
through destabilizing capital movements. This situation may 
be prevented if the convergency of the economies can be 
realized. It may also be prevented by using a common monetary 
policy and highly coordinated fiscal policies. Hence, the 
problem of establishing a common central bank is to be solved 
as it will facilitate using a common monetary policy.
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APPENDIX
Table. 1
Parity and intervention point of the ECU in terms of the 
Deutch Mark in 01/02/ 1988
Equivalent,in DM,of the components of ECU where
Composition of ECU
Each EEC currency is at Each EEC currency shows 
par with the Df-i  ^ a depreciation of
2.25 7. versus
DM DM
DM 0.719
BFR+LFR 3.850 0.18432 0.180173
HFL 0.256 O.22797 0.22284
DKR 0.219 0.05722 0.05593
LIT 140.000 0.190216 0.185936
FF 1.310 0.388695 0.37995
UKL 0.0878 0.2611 0.25522
IRL 0.00871 0.023 0.0225
DRA 1.150 0.014434 0.014115
1 ECU is worth 2.06618 DM 2-03568
MDS in 7. ■
Source: Eurostat ECU-EMS Information Monthly, March 1988
7-1-478
A fter it is  looked down the exchange rates of the EMS currencies  
in terms of the ECU, these computations can be done to find the 
va lu e  of each currency as in the example:
1 ECU = 2. O<5<5!0 DM and 1 ECU = 43. 1553 BFR+LFR <3>
2. 0<5<$18
==> -------------  ^ 3. 05 = O. 10432 ==> IBFR+LFR = O. 10432 DM
43. 1553
Example 0.100173 = 0.10432 -  0 .0 2 2 5 *0 .1 0 4 3 2
2. O<5<5!0
Maximum D ivergence Spread  in 96
2. O35<50
-----------------  *  lOO
2. 0<$518
Table.2 Variability of Exchange Rates
(Periodic Average)
Bilateral Rates^
Against ERM currencies Against non-ERM currencies
Nominal Real^ Nominal Rea 1
1974-78 1978-86 1974-78 1979-86 1974-78 1979-86 1974-78 1979-86
Belgium 20.3 13-3 21.9 13.9 36.7 47.7 35.8 46.9
Denmark 25.0 14.4 25.8 14.1 32.3 44.4 37.3 44.0
France 31.6 16.9 30.4 17.9 37.8 51.1 35.3 47.7
Germany 29.2 16.1 28.0 15.7 35.7 43.1 32.8 44.3
Ireland 36,0 15.8 27.7 19.4 37.0 46.6 33.4 43.6
Italy 36 . o 18.3 26.0 18.3 38.0 48.2 32.3 43.2
Nedherland 21-i 12.8 21.0 13.1 36.8 46.7 34.3 48.3
Av. ERM 28.4 15.4 25.8 16.1 36.3 46.8 34.5 45.4
Austria 20.3 11.8 19.3 11.0 39.5 47.9 35.5 48.8
Canada 44.1 52.3 43.4 51.5 23.4 18.9 21.8 21.1
Japan 44.5 47.1 40.9 44.4 46.7 56.0 44.0 58.6
Norway 25.3 29.3 24.6 27.2 35.6 40.2 31.7 39.0
Sweden 30.2 31.3 28.1 32.8 39.9 43.1 34.2 41.8
Switzerl. 44.0 25.7 35.7 23.4 48.0 49.0 43.4 49.0
United K. 32.7 41.0 28.3 44.6 49.6 51.3 40.0 53.1
United St,34.7 56.1 33.1 54.0 34.2 39.1 31.6 41.5
Av..non 
ERM^
34.5 36.8 31.7 36.1 39.6 43.2 35.3 44.1
Av. Europ. 
non-ERM'· 30.5 27.8 27.2 27.8 42.5 46.3 37.0 46.3
Source: International Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper No. 61, Policy
Coordination in the European Monetary System,
Weighted a v e ra ge  <m ultllateral exchange rate model <MERM) weights), 
of v a r ia b il ity  of exchange rates against ERM or non-ERM currencies, 
with v a r ia b il ity  measured by coeffic ien t of v a ria tion  (m ultiplied  
by 1,000) of a v e ra ge  monthly b ila te ra l exchange rates.
Nominal exchange rates adjusted for re la t iv e  consumer price movrements 
; w holesa le  p rices for fo r Ire land .
Nominal exchange adjusted for re la t iv e  consumer price movements 
w holesa le  prices for Ire land .
Unweighted ave ra ge .
Unweighted ave ra ge .
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Correlations between Changes in the Price Level (AF’), Nominal 
Exchange Rates (AS), and Real Exchange Rates (AR) for France, 
Germany, and United Kingdom
Germany
Table 3
France United Kingdom
AP AS AR AF- AS AR AP AS AR
1920s
AP 1 1 1
AS 0.54 1 0.99 1 0.18 1
AR 0.15 0.80 1 0.10 0.13 1 0.65 0.25 1
1970s
AP 1 1 1
AS 0.31 1 0.27 1 0.04 1
AR 0.27 0.82 1 0.29 0.91 1 0.33 0.76 1
Source: Real Exchange Rate Variability from 1920 to 1926 and from 1973
to 1980. Princeton Studies in International Finance No.86 
September, Princeton University
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Rate of Growth of Narrow Money, 1974-85
(Annual change in percent)
Table.4
A ve rage Av
, 1977 1978 74-78 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 79-8-
8.3 5.9 8.6 2.5 0.2 2.2 3.9 8.6 0.3 2.9
8.0 16.1 12.7 9.9 10.9 11.8 13.1 8.5 34.7 14.5
11.1 11.1 11.5 11.8 6,4 15.9 10.9 12.5 8.9 11.0
12.0 14.5 10.9 2.9 3.9 -1.5 7.2 8.4 5.9 4.4
22.5 27.6 19.0 8.1 14-0 3.4 5.4 11.4 9.6 8.6
21.4 26.6 17.8 23.7 12.9 9.8 16.8 13.2 12.4 14.7
13.2 4.2 11.4 2.8 6.0 -2.4 9.8 10.1 7.5 5.5
13.8 15.1 13.1 8.8 7.8 5.6 9.6 10.4 11.3 8.8
Belgium 6.2 15.7 7.0 
Denmark 4.7 30.2 6.3 
France 15.2 12.6 7.5 
Germ. 10.7 14.3 3.3 
Irelnd 9.0 19.9 16.9 
Italy 9.4 13.5 18-9 
Neth. 12.2 19.7 8.2
Av ERM 9.6 18.0 9.7
Source: International Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper No.48, The European
Monetary Systemi Recent Developments.
Table.5
Rate of Growth of Broad Money, 1974-85
(Annual change i n  p e r c e n t )
A ve rage A v .
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 74-78 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 79-8-
Belg. 8.7 15.3 12.6 8.4 7.5 10.5 6.2 3.3 6.3 7.2 8.3 4.5 6.0
Denm. 8.4 26.9 11.7 9.3 6.4 12.3 10.2 11.7 10.8 11.1 19.7 25.1 14.6
Fran. 17.8 15.7 12.3 14.6 12.2 14.5 13.9 8.3 11.1 11.3 11.4 7.9 10.6
Germ. 7.2 11.5 7.6 10.3 10.3 9.4 5.2 4.6 3.7 6.9 5.7 5.6 5.3
Irlnd. 19.3 21.7 13.0 20.6 23.5 19.6 13.6 20.6 10.8 6.8 6.7 9.0 11.1
Italy 15.7 24.5 21.0 22.2 23.0 21.2 19.4 12.2 10.2 17.6 13.7 10.8 13.9
Neth. 16.1 12.9 17.1 12.9 11.4 14.1 11.6 5.6 7.8 5.3 5.0 7.6 7.1
ERM 13.3 18.4 13.6 14.0 13.5 14.5 11.4 9.5 8.7 9.5 10.1 10.1 9.8
Source: International Moneatry Fund, Occasioanal Paper No.48, The European
Monetary System.
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Table. 6 Real Interest Rate Developments
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Belq+Lui< - 1n - a n - a n .a n -a ->4.5 5.9 6.1 2.4 6.1
Denmark n. a n -a n .a n - a 5.9 6.8 5.8 5.4 7.7
France n .a n - a n - a n-a 3.7 4.9 4.7 3.6 6.5
Germany n. a n. a n - a n - a 4.5 5.7 4.6 2.7 4.5
1reland n - a n - a n -a n -a 2.3 7.8 7.2 5.6 6.9
Italy n. a n. a n. a n. a 2.7 3.7 3.9 2.3 6.5
Netherland n . a n. a n - a n-a 6.6 6.0 5.2 6.7 8.1
Av-EMS n«a n - a n - a n - a 4.34 5.84 5.45 3.89 6.55
St. Dev- n „ a n - a n. a n-a 1.46 1.21 1.12 1.64 1.10
Un.King -(1) n. a n. a n-a n. a 5.5 6.3 4.5 5.9 5.1
Greece n. a n .a n .a n -a -0.8 -1.3 -1.5 -2.7 0.3
Spain n - a n -a n. a n. a 4.7 5.0 4.3 0.2 8.0
Portugal n -a n .a n -a n -a n. a -2.9 3.1 0.0 4.1
USA(2)^ n. a n. a n-a n-a 7.1 8.4 7.6 5.4 6.0
Japan(3) n .a n .a n -a n -a 6.5 5.4 4.5 3.2 4.7
lurkey 27.1 -33 - 7 -0.07 3.6 9.1 6.9 5.0 10.9 -3.0
(4)Av. of 1,
2 3 n. a n - a n-a n -a 6.37 6.7 5.53 4.83 5.27
St.Dev.for 4 n -a n .a n -a n -a 0.81 1.54 1.79 1.44 0.67
Source: Turkish Industrialist' and Businessmen's Association, 
Publication no: TOSIAD-T/ 88.5.115, /Qvrupa Para Siste/ni,
1
Not a v a ila b le
Reel Inter St Rate Is found by  using
<«l+Nom. Int. Rate>/<!+ in f. R ate » -  1>
Control group is  chosen to be formed by Un ited Kingdom, USA  
and Japan as they are  techno log ica lly  deve loped  countries.
the form ula
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Table.7 Average BNP Changes of EMS Countries and Standard
Deviation from the Average
Years
1972_S2
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987 
1988^
Average. BNP
2.663 
0.800 
3.025 
2.238 
2.300 
1.613 
1.688
Deviation from Average
0.780 
1.580 
1.320 
0.860 
0.820 
0.960 
0.550
Sources Turkish Industrialist' and Businessmen's Association,
Publication nos TOSIAD-T/ 88.5.115, Avrttps Pars Sistemi.
Table.8 Unemployment Rates of the EMS Countries
Belgium
Luxembourg
Denmark
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Netherland
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
13.0 14.3 14.4 13.6 12.5 12.4 12.1
1.3 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.4
9.3 10.1 9.9 8.7 7.6 7.7 8.6
8.7 8.9 10.0 10.5 10.7 11.3 11.7
6.9 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.1 8.1 8.3
12.3 14.9 16.6 18.0 18.3 18.5 18.2
9.7 10.9 11.9 12.9 13.8 14.2 14.3
11.8 14.3 14.5 13.3 12.4 11.4 10.9
Source 5 Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association, 
Publication nos T0SIAD-T/S8.5.115, Av-'rupa Para Sistemi.
Estimated
Estimated
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FIGURE 1
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